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Abstract	  Only	   three	  days	  after	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  nuclear	  catastrophe	   in	  Fukushima,	   Japan,	  on	  11	  March	  2011,	  the	  German	  government	  ordered	  8	  of	  the	  country’s	  17	  existing	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  (NPPs)	  to	  stop	  operating	  within	  a	   few	  days.	   In	  summer	  2011	  the	  govern-­‐ment	  put	  forward	  a	  law	  –	  passed	  in	  parliament	  by	  a	  large	  majority	  –	  that	  calls	  for	  a	  com-­‐plete	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2022.	  These	  government	  actions	  were	  in	  contrast	  to	  its	  initial	  plans,	  laid	  out	  in	  fall	  2010,	  to	  expand	  the	  lifetimes	  of	  the	  country’s	  NPPs.	  The	  immediate	  closure	  of	  8	  NPPs	  and	  the	  plans	  for	  a	  complete	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  within	  little	   more	   than	   a	   decade,	   raised	   concerns	   about	   Germany's	   ability	   to	   secure	   a	   stable	  supply	   of	   electricity.	   Some	   observers	   feared	   power	   supply	   shortages,	   increasing	   CO2-­‐emissions	  and	  a	  need	  for	  Germany	  to	  become	  a	  net	  importer	  of	  electricity.	  	  Now	  –	  a	  little	  more	  than	  a	  year	  after	  the	  phase-­‐out	  law	  entered	  into	  force	  –	  this	  paper	  ex-­‐amines	  these	  concerns	  using	  a)	  recent	  statistical	  data	  on	  electricity	  production	  and	  de-­‐mand	   in	   the	   first	  15	  months	  after	   the	  German	  government’s	   immediate	   reaction	   to	   the	  Fukushima	  accident	  and	  b)	  reviews	  the	  most	  recent	  projections	  and	  scenarios	  by	  differ-­‐ent	   stakeholders	  on	  how	   the	  German	  electricity	   system	  may	  develop	  until	   2025,	  when	  NPPs	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  in	  operation.	  The	  paper	  finds	  that	  Germany	  has	  a	  realistic	  chance	  of	  fully	  replacing	  nuclear	  power	  with	  additional	   renewable	  electricity	  generation	  on	  an	  annual	  basis	  by	  2025	  or	  earlier,	  pro-­‐vided	  that	  several	  related	  challenges,	  e.g.	  expansion	  of	  the	  grids	  and	  provision	  of	  balanc-­‐ing	  power,	  can	  be	  solved	  successfully.	  Already	   in	  2012	  additional	  electricity	  generation	  from	   renewable	   energy	   sources	   in	   combination	   with	   a	   reduced	   domestic	   demand	   for	  electricity	  will	  likely	  fully	  compensate	  for	  the	  reduced	  power	  generation	  from	  the	  NPPs	  shut	  down	  in	  March	  2011.	  	  If	  current	  political	  targets	  will	  be	  realised,	  Germany	  neither	  has	  to	  become	  a	  net	  electrici-­‐ty	   importer,	   nor	   will	   be	   unable	   to	   gradually	   reduce	   fossil	   fuel	   generated	   electricity.	  Whether	  the	  reduction	  in	  fossil	  fuel	  use	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  adequately	  contribute	  to	  na-­‐tional	   greenhouse	   gas	   mitigation	   targets	   significantly	   depends	   on	   an	   active	   policy	   to	  promote	  electricity	  savings,	   continuous	  efforts	   to	   increase	   the	  use	  of	   renewables	  and	  a	  higher	  share	  of	  natural	  gas	  (preferably	  used	  in	  combined	  heat	  and	  power	  plants)	  in	  fossil	  fuel	  power	  generation.	  	  
1	  Introduction	  	  	  	  	  	  Less	  than	  a	  week	  after	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  nuclear	  catastrophe	  in	  Fukushima,	  Japan,	  on	  11	  March	   2011,	   the	   German	   government	   ordered	   8	   of	   Germany’s	   17	   existing	   nuclear	  power	  plants	   (NPPs)	   to	  stop	  operating	   for	  an	   initial	  3-­‐month	  evaluation	  period.	  These	  were	  the	  7	  oldest	  NPPs	  still	  in	  operation	  in	  Germany	  at	  that	  time	  plus	  the	  NPP	  ‘Krümmel’	  in	  northern	  Germany,	  which	  had	  previously	  suffered	   from	  various	   technical	  problems.	  Two	  of	  these	  8	  NPPs	  had	  not	  been	  in	  operation	  since	  2007	  and	  2009	  respectively	  due	  to	  technical	  reasons.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  2011	  a	  law	  came	  into	  force	  that	  finally	  terminated	  the	  operating	  licenses	  of	  those	  8	  plants,	  with	  an	  instruction	  for	  the	  remaining	  9	  NPPs	  to	  be	   closed	  down	   successively	   by	   the	   end	  of	   2022.	   In	  making	   this	   decision,	   the	   govern-­‐ment	  basically	   returned	   to	   the	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  plan	   that	   had	  originally	   been	   imple-­‐mented	  by	  a	  previous	  government	  in	  2002	  but	  had	  been	  modified	  by	  the	  current	  –	  then	  newly	  elected	  –	  government	  in	  October	  2010,	  granting	  an	  average	  of	  12	  additional	  oper-­‐ating	  years	  to	  all	  17	  NPPs1.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  more	  details	   on	  Germany’s	   nuclear	   policy	   before	   and	   after	   Fukushima,	   see	   e.g.	  Wittneben	   (2011),	  Jahn/Korolczuk	  (2012)	  or	  Bosman	  (2012).	  
	  The	  decision	  to	  shut	  down	  8	  NPPs	  immediately	  and	  to	  phase-­‐out	  the	  remaining	  NPPs	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come	  raised	  concerns	  about	  Germany's	  ability	  to	  secure	  a	  stable	  supply	  of	  electricity.	  Critics	  warned	  of	  rising	  electricity	  prices	  and	  a	  considerable	  increase	  in	  Ger-­‐many’s	   fossil	   fuel	   based	   power	   generation,	   with	   related	   increases	   in	   CO2	   emissions.	  Some	  people	  also	  predicted	   that	  Germany	  would	  become	  a	   significant	  net	   importer	  of	  electricity	   from	   neighbouring	   countries,	   including	   nuclear	   electricity	   from	   France	   and	  the	  Czech	  Republic.	  	  This	  paper	  does	  not	   aim	   to	   analyse	  what	  would	  have	  happened	   to	  CO2	   emissions	   and	  electricity	   prices	   if	   the	   decisions	   to	   extend	   the	   lifetimes	   of	   the	   existing	   NPPs	   had	   not	  been	  reversed	  after	  the	  Fukushima	  accidents.	  Rather,	  it	  attempts	  to	  provide	  a)	  a	  prelim-­‐inary	  assessment	  of	  the	  immediate	  changes	  brought	  about	  in	  the	  electricity	  market	  fol-­‐lowing	  the	  shut	  down	  of	  8	  NPPs	  in	  March	  2011	  and	  b)	  a	  projection	  showing	  how	  the	  de-­‐crease	   in	  nuclear	  generation	  will	  be	   compensated	   for	  until	  2025	  and	  what	  effects	   this	  may	  have	  on	  electricity	  prices	  and	  CO2	  emissions.	  	  
2	  Methodology	  	  	  To	  analyse	  the	  short-­‐term	  effects	  of	  the	  instant	  loss	  of	  around	  40%	  of	  the	  country’s	  nu-­‐clear	  power	  capacity,	  we	  take	  the	  electricity	  production	  of	  the	  year	  2010	  as	  a	  reference	  to	  reflect	   the	   typical	  electricity	  market	  situation	   in	  an	  annual	  period	  unaffected	  by	  the	  phase-­‐out	  decision2.	   In	  2010,	  15	  of	   the	  17	  nuclear	  power	  plants	   (NPPs)	  produced	  141	  TWh	  of	  gross	  electricity3.	  Official	  energy	  projections	  in	  2010,	  which	  analysed	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  prolongation	  of	  nuclear	  lifetimes	  (BMWi	  2010;	  Nagl	  et	  al.	  2011)4,	  predicted	  simi-­‐lar	  levels	  of	  production	  until	  2020.	  Renewables	  contributed	  103	  TWh	  in	  2010.	  Net	  elec-­‐tricity	  exports	  were	  at	  18	  TWh,	  a	  level	  that	  had	  been	  relatively	  constant	  since	  2006	  (14	  to	  22	  TWh/a).	  	  	  Our	  comparison	  comprises	  three	  stages.	  Firstly,	  in	  section	  3	  we	  examine	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  German	  electricity	  system	  with	  regards	  to	  both	  the	  short-­‐term	  effects	  from	  2011	  to	  2013,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  longer-­‐term	  outlook	  to	  2025	  (a	  few	  years	  after	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out).	  For	  the	  second	  stage,	  we	  use	  the	  most	  recently	  available	  key	  energy	  scenarios	  and	  political	  targets	  in	  section	  4	  to	  provide	  one	  ‘optimistic’	  and	  one	  ‘pessimis-­‐tic’	   scenario	  on	   the	   replacement	  of	  nuclear	  electricity	  and	   its	  effects	  on	  CO2	  emissions	  until	  2025.	  Finally,	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  on	  electricity	  prices,	  we	  discuss	  in	  section	  5	  the	  results	  of	  several	  modelling	  studies	  conducted	  in	  re-­‐cent	  years.	  Section	  6	  concludes.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  As	  levels	  of	  electricity	  generation,	  as	  well	  as	  net	  exports,	  traditionally	  fluctuate	  significantly	  on	  a	  season-­‐al	   basis	   it	   is	   important	   to	   either	   look	   at	   entire	   years	   instead	  of	   single	  months	  when	   comparing	  periods	  before	  and	  after	  the	  shutdown	  of	  NPPs	  or	  to	  compare	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  a	  year	  only	  with	  the	  same	  period	  of	  another	  year.	  3	  Annual	  electricity	  generation	  from	  nuclear	  power	  in	  2010	  was	  at	  a	  similar	  level	  as	  in	  the	  years	  between	  2007	  and	  2009	  (135	  to	  149	  TWh/a).	  4	  Those	  scenarios	  of	  the	  study	  with	  lifetime	  extensions	  for	  NPPs	  predicted	  production	  levels	  of	  about	  149	  TWh	  for	  2020	  followed	  by	  a	  decline	  in	  later	  years.	  
3	  Changes	  in	  power	  generation	  due	  to	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  	  
3.1	  Short-­‐term	  effects	  until	  2013	  Based	  on	  preliminary	  statistical	  data	  on	  power	  generation	  in	  2011	  (BDEW,	  2011,	  2012a,	  AG	  Energiebilanzen	  2012)	  and	  on	  the	  typical	  production	  over	  the	  previous	  decade	  of	  the	  nuclear	   power	  plants	   still	   in	   operation	   (IAEA,	   2012),	  we	   estimate	   that	   the	   permanent	  shutdown	  of	  the	  eight	  NPPs	  in	  March	  2011	  resulted	  in	  a	  potential	  ‘loss’	  of	  nuclear	  elec-­‐tricity	  generation	  of	  32.5	  TWh	  in	  2011	  and	  will	  result	  in	  a	  loss	  of	  around	  41	  TWh/a	  in	  both	  2012	  and	  20135.	  Relating	  the	   loss	  of	  nuclear	  power	  generation	  of	   the	  years	  2012	  and	  2013	  to	  actual	  electricity	  generation	  in	  2010,	  this	  loss	  is	  equivalent	  to	  almost	  30%	  of	  nuclear	  power	  generation	  and	  to	  about	  7%	  of	  all	  electricity	  generation	   in	  Germany.	  After	  the	  permanent	  shutdown	  of	  the	  eight	  NPPs,	  the	  loss	  of	  nuclear	  power	  production	  was	  mostly	  compensated	  for	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  increased	  renewable	  electricity	  gener-­‐ation,	   reduced	  net	  electricity	  exports	  and	   reduced	  domestic	   electricity	  demand,	   as	   the	  figure	  shows.	  	  Electricity	   generation,	   net	   electricity	   exports	   and	   domestic	   electricity	   demand	   in	   Ger-­‐many	   show	   typical	   seasonal	   patterns.	   Therefore	   the	   picture	   of	   what	   has	   changed	   in	  German	  electricity	  supply	  and	  demand	  since	  Fukushima	  becomes	  clearer	  when	  the	  same	  periods	  of	  different	  years	  are	  compared.	  This	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  eliminating	  seasonal	  effects,	  which	  can	  otherwise	  mask	  the	  de	  facto	  changes.	  Based	  on	  (preliminary)	  energy	  statistics,	   Figure	   1	   shows	   the	   quarterly	   changes	   in	   electricity	   supply	   and	   demand	   in	  2011	  and	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2012	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  respective	  quarters	  in	  the	  reference	  year	  2010.	  	  The	  figure	  shows	  that	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2011,	  which	  was	  largely	  unaffected	  by	  the	  shutdown	  of	  NPPs,	  German	  electricity	  supply	  and	  demand	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  first	  quar-­‐ter	  of	  2010.	  Electricity	  generation	  from	  renewables	  was	  up	  by	  about	  3	  TWh	  and	  nuclear	  power	  production	  and	  electricity	  demand	  were	  both	  slightly	  higher	  (note	  that	  a	  negative	  demand	   reduction	   in	   the	   figure	   corresponds	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   demand)	  while	   exports	  were	  slightly	   lower.	  Fossil	   fuels	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  providing	  the	  required	  remaining	  elec-­‐tricity	  generation,	  which	  was	  about	  5	  TWh	  lower	  than	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2010.	  	  






































































Figure:	   Changes	  in	  the	  German	  quarterly	  electricity	  supply	  and	  demand	  balance	  com-­‐pared	  to	  the	  respective	  periods	  in	  2010	  for	  all	  four	  2011	  quarters,	  the	  first	  two	  quarters	  of	  2012	  and	  for	  projections	  for	  the	  years	  2012	  and	  2013	  (average	  per	  quarter)	  	  (own	  calculations	  based	  on	  AG	  Energiebilanzen	  2012,	  BDEW	  2011,	  2012a,	  2012b,	  2012c;	  destatis	  2012;	  for	  further	  data	  see	  Table	  S1	  of	  supplementary	  material)	  	  With	   the	  permanent	  shutdown	  of	  eight	  NPPs	  (six	  of	  which	  were	  operating	   throughout	  2010)	   the	   picture	   changed	   significantly	   from	   the	   second	   quarter	   of	   2011	   on.	   Nuclear	  power	  generation	  was	  about	  10	  to	  12	  TWh	  lower	  in	  all	  of	  the	  last	  three	  quarters	  of	  2011	  and	  the	  first	  two	  quarters	  of	  2012	  –	  a	  reduction	  that	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  roughly	  con-­‐stant	  until	   the	  end	  of	  2013.	   In	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2011	  this	  reduced	  nuclear	  power	  supply	  was	  compensated	  mainly	  by	  an	  increased	  generation	  from	  renewables	  (5	  TWh)	  and	  a	  significant	  reduction	  in	  net	  exports	  (6	  TWh).	  	  The	  next	  four	  quarters	  from	  July	  2011	  to	  June	  2012	  showed	  a	  gradual	  adaptation	  of	  the	  demand	  and	  supply	  balance	  to	  the	  new	  situation.	  Electricity	  generation	  from	  renewables	  increased	   successively	  and	   reached	  a	  plus	  of	   almost	  11	  TWh	   in	  Q2	  2012.	  At	   the	   same	  time	  electricity	  demand	  did	  not	  further	  increase	  but	  fell	  slightly	  below	  2010	  levels	  and	  net	  exports	  increased	  again	  –	  although	  they	  did	  not	  fully	  recovered	  from	  their	  2010	  lev-­‐els	  until	  Q2	  2012.	  Increasing	  electricity	  generation	  from	  renewables,	  lower	  net	  exports	  and	  (slightly)	  lower	  domestic	  power	  demand	  combined	  to	  limit	  the	  need	  for	  an	  increase	  in	  fossil	  power	  generation	  to	  a	  very	  moderate	  level	  (1	  to	  2	  TWh	  per	  quarter)	  in	  the	  last	  three	  quarters	  of	  2011.	  The	  same	  effects,	  especially	  a	  further	  increase	  in	  electricity	  gen-­‐eration	   from	   renewables	   even	   allowed	   fossil	   fuel	   power	   generation	   to	   be	   reduced	   in	  2012	  by	  2	  TWh	  (Q1)	  and	  5	  TWh	  (Q2)	  compared	  to	  the	  respective	  quarters	  of	  2010.	  As	  the	  projections	  for	  2012	  and	  2013	  show,	  this	  pattern	  is	  expected	  to	  last	  over	  the	  coming	  years.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  two	  further	  insights	  that	  Figure	  1	  offers	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  electricity	  generated	  by	  renewable	  sources	  in	  Q2	  2012:	  First,	  in	  that	  quarter	  renewa-­‐
ble	  electricity	  generation	  reached	  a	  level	  that	  projections	  from	  fall	  2011	  expected	  to	  be	  reached	  only	  by	  2013.6	  And	  second,	   the	  additional	  electricity	  generation	   from	  renewa-­‐bles	  in	  that	  quarter	  compared	  to	  2010	  has	  already	  almost	  entirely	  compensated	  the	  loss	  of	  electricity	  generation	  from	  the	  six	  (previously	  operational)	  NPPs	  shut	  down	  in	  spring	  2011.	  	  For	  a	  preliminary	  analysis	  of	  the	  entire	  year	  2012	  and	  the	  year	  2013,	  recent	  projections	  of	   electricity	   demand	   and	   renewable	   electricity	   generation	   on	   behalf	   of	   Germany’s	  Transmission	  System	  Operators	  (TSOs)	  (IE,	  2011;	  Prognos,	  2011)	  were	  used.	  These	  pro-­‐jections	  expect	  gross	  electricity	  consumption	   to	  decrease	  over	   the	  coming	  years	  while	  renewable	  electricity	  generation	  is	  expected	  to	  continue	  to	  grow	  significantly.	  In	  2013,	  the	   additional	   electricity	   generation	   from	   renewable	   sources,	   compared	   to	   the	   pre	  phase-­‐out	  situation	  in	  2010,	  is	  projected	  to	  be	  higher	  than	  the	  loss	  of	  nuclear	  electricity	  from	  the	  six	  (previously	  operational)	  NPPs.	  For	  simplicity,	  we	  assume	  here	  a	  balance	  in	  electricity	  imports	  and	  exports	  for	  Germany	  in	  2012	  and	  20137	  (whereas	  Germany	  actu-­‐ally	  realised	  net	  exports	  of	  17.7	  TWh	  in	  2010	  6.0	  TWh	  in	  2011	  and	  7.8	  TWh	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  20128).	  	  
3.2	  Outlook	  until	  2025	  	  Compensating	  for	  the	  closure	  of	  eight	  NPPs	  is	  only	  the	  first	  step	  of	  the	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  in	  Germany.	  Current	  law	  states	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2022	  the	  remaining	  nine	  NPPs	  have	  to	  be	   shut	  down.	   In	   the	   following	   section	  we	   evaluate	  whether	   all	  NPPs9,	  which	   in	  2010	  generated	  roughly	  140	  TWh,	  can	  eventually	  be	  compensated	  for	  by	  additional	  domestic	  renewable	  power	  generation.	  	  	  The	   following	   table	   compares	   annual	   renewable	   electricity	   generation	   projections	   of	  two	   recent	   scenario	   studies	   commissioned	   by	   the	   federal	   ministries	   of	   environment	  (BMU)	  and	  economy	  (BMWi)	  with	  the	  mid-­‐term	  projections	  (which	  end	  in	  2016)	  for	  the	  electricity	  system	  operators	  (TSOs).	  Also	  shown	  are	  the	  official	  expectations	  at	   federal	  level	  –	  as	  described	  in	  Germany’s	  National	  Renewable	  Energy	  Action	  Plan	  submitted	  to	  the	  European	  Commission	  in	  2010	  –	  and	  the	  expected	  combined	  effects	  of	  the	  political	  targets	  set	  individually	  by	  the	  German	  federal	  states	  (‘Länder’).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  According	  to	  preliminary	  statistical	  data,	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  reached	  a	  share	  of	  24%	  in	  German	  gross	  electricity	  generation	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2012	  (BDEW	  2012c).	  This	  compares	  with	  20%	  in	  2010,	  7%	  in	  2000	  and	  4%	  in	  1990	  (AG	  Energiebilanzen	  2012).	  7	  This	  may	  go	  along	  with	  an	  increasing	  volume	  of	  exports	  and	  imports	  due	  to	  the	  need	  for	  Germany	  and	  its	  neighbours	  to	  balance	  increasing	  amounts	  of	  fluctuating	  renewable	  electricity	  generation.	  8	  Due	   to	   its	   location	   in	   the	   centre	   of	   Europe,	   Germany	   has	   always	   imported	   and	   exported	   significant	  amounts	  of	  electricity.	  At	  about	  40	  to	  60	  TWh/a	  both	  imports	  and	  exports	  have,	  in	  recent	  years,	  been	  in	  the	  range	  of	  10%	  of	  annual	  domestic	  electricity	  generation.	  The	  main	  reasons	  for	  this	  significant	  exchange	  of	  electricity	  are	   the	  short	  and	   long-­‐term	  balancing	  of	  power	  supply,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   transit	  of	  electricity	  through	  the	  German	  grid.	  For	  example,	  electricity	  generated	  in	  France	  and	  used	  in	  Italy	  is	  partly	  delivered	  via	  the	  German	  and	  Swiss	  grids.	  9	  Of	  the	  17	  NPPs	  only	  15	  were	  in	  operation	  in	  2010,	  see	  above.	  
Table:	  Gross	  electricity	  generation	  (in	  TWh)	  from	  domestic	  renewable	  energy	  sources;	  comparison	  of	  scenarios	  and	  political	  ambitions	  (2010	  to	  2025)	  	  	   	   2010	   2011	   2015	   2020	   2025	   2025	  vs.	  2010	  
Actual	   a	   103	   122	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  Scenarios/	  projections	   TSOs	  b	   -­‐	   122	   174	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  BMU	  c	   103	   116	   166	   234	   283	   +180	  BMWi	  d	   -­‐	   -­‐	   161	   199	   231	   +128	  Political	  	  targets/	  expecta-­‐tions	  
NREAP	  e	   105	   116	   168	   217	   -­‐	   -­‐	  Länder	  f	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   315	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
a	  AG	  Energiebilanzen	  (2012),	  b	  IE	  (2011),	  c	  BMU	  (2012),	  d	  BMWi	  (2011),	  e	  National	  Renewable	  
Energy	  Action	  Plan	  (German	  Government,	  2010),	  f	  Sum	  of	  individual	  targets	  of	  German	  federal	  
states	  (dena,	  2011)	  	  	  The	   table	   shows	   that	   the	   two	   scenario	   studies	   (BMU,	   2012;	   BMWi,	   2011)	   provide	   a	  range	  of	  expectations	  regarding	  electricity	  generation	  from	  renewables,	  mainly	  for	  2020	  and	  2025.	  The	  scenario	  for	  the	  ministry	  of	  environment	  (BMU,	  2012)	  expects	  renewable	  electricity	  generation	  to	  reach	  283	  TWh/a	  by	  2025	  while	  the	  scenario	  for	  the	  ministry	  of	  economy	   (BMWi,	  2011;	  Fürsch	  et	   al.	   2012)	   foresees	  231	  TWh/a	   (or	  18%	   less)	  by	   the	  same	  year.	   The	   recent	   projections	   for	   the	  TSOs	   indicate	   that	   until	   2015	   growth	   in	   re-­‐newable	  electricity	  generation	  might	  actually	  exceed	  the	  expectations	  in	  both	  scenarios,	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  current	  fast	  expansion	  of	  solar	  PV.	  For	  2020	  the	  German	  government’s	  expectations	   (as	   expressed	   in	   its	   National	   Renewable	   Energy	   Action	   Plan)	   are	   in	   be-­‐tween	  the	  figures	  found	  in	  the	  two	  scenarios	  from	  both	  ministries.	  The	  current	  political	  targets	  of	  the	  Länder	  –	  which	  have	  been	  influenced	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  Fukushima	  –	  are	  as	  a	  sum	  significantly	  more	  ambitious	  than	  both	  the	  scenarios	  and	  also	  the	  federal	  gov-­‐ernment’s	  expectations.	  	  For	  2020	  different	  expectations	  about	  the	  growth	  in	  onshore	  wind	  capacity	  are	  mainly	  responsible	   for	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   scenarios	   and	   the	   political	   targets	   of	   the	  Länder.	  As	  onshore	  wind	  is	  a	  technology	  that	  is	  already	  relatively	  close	  to	  being	  compet-­‐itive	  even	  without	  support	  measures,	  its	  deployment	  depends	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  on	  the	  states	  and	  the	  municipalities,	  who	  are	  together	  responsible	  for	  planning	  the	  sites	  of	  wind	  power	  plants.	   In	  2025	  the	  main	  difference	  between	  the	   two	  scenarios	   lies	   in	  off-­‐shore	  wind	  capacity,	  but	  differences	  in	  solar	  PV	  deployment	  also	  play	  an	  important	  role	  (see	  Table	  S2	  in	  the	  supplementary	  material).	  This	  overview	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  current	  deployment	  trends,	  as	  well	  as	  current	  political	  targets,	   indicate	   continued	   strong	  growth	   in	   renewable	  electricity	  generation	  over	   the	  coming	  years.	  Therefore,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  in	  comparison	  to	  2010,	  by	  2025	  renewables	  will	  additionally	  supply	  at	  least	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  electricity	  as	  was	  produced	  by	  all	  of	  Germany’s	  NPPs	  before	  the	  2011	  phase-­‐out	  decision	  (about	  140	  TWh/a).	  This	  outcome	  does,	  of	   course,	  presuppose	   that	   the	  challenges	  of	   such	  rapid	  change	   in	   the	  method	  of	  generating	  electricity	  will	  be	  met	  successfully.	   In	  particular,	   the	   timely	  adaptation	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  electricity	  grids,	  i.e.	  of	  high	  voltage	  as	  well	  as	  medium	  and	  low-­‐voltage	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  lines,	  are	  critical	  factors	  in	  ensuring	  a	  positive	  outcome.	  
4	  Effects	  on	  CO2	  emissions	  of	  fossil	  power	  generation	  Electricity	  sector	  CO2	  emissions	  in	  2011	  were	  only	  slightly	  higher	  (+0.7%)	  than	  in	  2010	  (UBA,	  2012)	  as	  the	  reduction	  in	  electricity	  supply	  from	  nuclear	  energy10	  was	  almost	  en-­‐tirely	   compensated	   by	   the	   combined	   effects	   of	  more	   renewables,	   lower	   net	   electricity	  exports	  and	  slightly	  lower	  domestic	  electricity	  demand.	  Fossil	  fuel	  use	  and	  related	  emis-­‐sions,	  however,	  would	  ceteris	  paribus	  have	  been	  lower	  in	  2011	  than	  in	  2010	  if	  the	  eight	  NPPs	  (six	  of	  which	  were	  actually	  in	  operation	  in	  2010)	  had	  not	  been	  shut	  down,	  as	  the	  additional	  carbon-­‐free	  electricity	  would	  have	  replaced	  electricity	  generation	  in	  conven-­‐tional	  fossil	  fuel	  power	  plants.	  Both	  electricity	  generation	  from	  fossil	  fuels	  and	  electricity	  sector	  CO2	  emissions	  would	  have	  likely	  been	  5	  to	  6%	  lower	  in	  2011	  compared	  to	  2010	  if	  it	  had	  not	  been	  for	  the	  shutdown	  of	  the	  8	  NPPs.11	  Nevertheless,	  to	  understand	  the	  bigger	  picture	  it	  has	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  that	  Ger-­‐many’s	  fossil	  fuel	  power	  plants	  operate	  within	  the	  European	  Union’s	  Emissions	  Trading	  System	  (ETS).	  Overall,	  CO2	  emissions	  within	  the	  EU	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  unaffected	  by	  the	  phase-­‐out	  decision	  as	  there	  is	  a	  firm	  cap	  on	  total	  emissions	  within	  the	  EU	  ETS	  and	  this	  cap	  has	  already	  been	  fixed	  for	  the	  forthcoming	  years.	  This	  means	  that	  additional	  emis-­‐sions	  –	  or	   slower	   reductions	  –	   from	  the	  German	  electricity	   sector	  would	   ‘only’	   lead	   to	  higher	  prices	  for	  CO2	  emission	  allowances	  in	  the	  ETS	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  nuclear	  prolon-­‐gation	  path.	  Furthermore	  –	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  long	  term	  –	  a	  (faster)	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  does	  not	  nec-­‐essarily	  imply	  higher	  CO2	  emissions	  from	  the	  German	  electricity	  sector	  itself.	  For	  exam-­‐ple,	  as	  the	  German	  Advisory	  Council	  on	  the	  Environment	  has	  pointed	  out	  (SRU,	  2010),	  lifetime	  extensions	  for	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  would	  have	  imposed	  a	  significant	  barrier	  to	  the	  further	  growth	  of	  renewable	  energy	  technologies,	  to	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  combined	  heat	  and	  power	  plants	  and	  to	  the	  successful	  reduction	  in	  electricity	  demand.	  The	  incom-­‐patibility	  between	  nuclear	  power	  and	  high	  shares	  of	  renewable	  energy	  is	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	   inability	   of	   the	   former	   (technically	   as	  well	   as	   economically)	   to	   provide	   the	   opera-­‐tional	   flexibility	   that	   the	   integration	   of	   high	   levels	   of	   fluctuating	   renewable	   energy	  sources	  requires.	  The	  limited	  mitigation	  potential	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  in	  an	  electric-­‐ity	   system	   dominated	   by	   variable	   renewable	   generation,	   such	   as	   wind	   and	   solar,	   are	  demonstrated	   in	   modelling	   studies	   by	   Denholm/Hand	   (2011)	   and	   Hart/Jacobson	  (2012).12	  While	  current	  regulation	  in	  Germany13	  makes	  the	  expansion	  of	  renewable	  energy	  plants	  economically	  attractive	  independent	  of	  the	  role	  of	  nuclear	  power,	   it	   is	   likely	  that	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  As	  is	  the	  case	  with	  most	  renewable	  energy	  plants,	  NPPs	  do	  not	  emit	  any	  CO2	  during	  electricity	  genera-­‐tion	  itself,	  though	  there	  are	  some	  life-­‐cycle	  CO2	  emissions	  (Weisser,	  2007).	  11	  These	  figures	  were	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	  assumptions	  that	  without	  the	  shutdown	  the	  German	  NPPs	  would	  have	  generated	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  electricity	  in	  2011	  as	  they	  did	  in	  2010	  (140.5	  TWh),	  that	  elec-­‐tricity	  generation	  from	  renewables	  in	  2011	  would	  have	  been	  unaffected	  (122	  TWh)	  due	  to	  a	  stable	  sup-­‐port	  scheme	  and	  priority	  grid	  access	  for	  renewables	  and	  that	  net	  exports	  would	  not	  have	  decreased	  from	  17.7	  TWh	  in	  2010	  to	  6	  TWh	  in	  2011	  but	  would	  have	  remained	  unchanged	  at	  the	  2010	  level.	  	  12	  See	   also	   Verbruggen	   (2008)	   for	   a	   discussion	   about	   the	   difficulties	   of	   combining	   renewable	   energy	  sources	  and	  nuclear	  power	  in	  a	  long-­‐term	  mitigation	  strategy.	  13	  As	   in	   many	   other	   European	   countries,	   feed-­‐in	   tariffs	   are	   used	   in	   Germany	   to	   support	   electricity	  generation	   from	   renewables	   (Mitchell	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Huenteler	   et	   al.	   2012).	   The	   German	   feed-­‐in-­‐law	  (Renewable	  Energy	  Sources	  Act,	  EEG)	  stipulates	  fixed	  technology-­‐specific	  tariffs	  to	  be	  paid	  (in	  most	  cases	  for	  a	  time	  span	  of	  20	  years)	  to	  the	  operators	  of	  renewable	  energy	  plants	  for	  each	  kWh	  they	  feed	  into	  the	  grid.	  The	  additional	  costs	  of	  renewables	  are	  shared	  among	  electricity	  consumers,	  though	  some	  consumers	  are	   exempted	   from	   having	   to	   pay	   the	   (full)	   share.	   The	   EEG	   also	   grants	   electricity	   generated	   from	  renewable	   sources	   priority	   access	   to	   the	   electricity	   grid.	   The	   combination	   of	   fixed	   feed-­‐in	   tariffs	   and	  
favourable	   political	   conditions	   for	   renewables	   would	   have	   come	   under	   much	   greater	  pressure	  from	  the	  politically	   influential	  energy	  companies	  that	  own	  the	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  if	  it	  had	  not	  been	  for	  the	  phase-­‐out	  decision.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  long-­‐term	  renewable	  energy	  sources	  will	  be	  used	  to	  a	  greater	  ex-­‐tent	  in	  Germany’s	  power	  sector	  compared	  to	  the	  hypothetical	  situation	  of	  a	  much	  slower	  nuclear	   phase-­‐out.	   Consequently,	   energy	   generated	   from	   renewable	   sources	   (as	   op-­‐posed	  to	  fossil	   fuels)	  will	  eventually	  compensate	  at	   least	  partially	  for	  the	  electricity	  no	  longer	  generated	  in	  nuclear	  power	  plants.	  To	  assess	  the	  potential	  development	  of	  CO2	  emissions	  from	  power	  generation	  in	  Germa-­‐ny	  we	  sketch	  two	  different	  scenarios.	  Both	  assume	  the	  current	  phase-­‐out	  plan	  as	  a	  given.	  The	  optimistic	  scenario	  combines	  a	  successful	  policy	  to	  reduce	  electricity	  demand	  with	  a	  switch	  within	   fossil	   generation	   from	   coal	   and	   lignite	   towards	   natural	   gas	   and	   the	   in-­‐creased	  use	  of	  combined	  heat	  and	  power14	  and	  especially	  of	  renewables	  as	  described	  in	  the	  scenario	  study	  for	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Environment	  (BMU,	  2012).	  In	  such	  an	  optimistic	  scenario,	   CO2	   emissions	   produced	   from	   German	   power	   generation	   would	   be	   around	  50%	  lower	  in	  2020	  than	  in	  1990	  (see	  Tables	  S2	  and	  S3	  in	  the	  supplementary	  material).	  Despite	  the	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out,	  the	  electricity	  sector	  would	  contribute	  disproportionate-­‐ly	  to	  the	  German	  government’s	  greenhouse	  gas	  reduction	  target	  of	  minus	  40%	  by	  2020	  (vs.	  1990).	  However,	  in	  a	  more	  pessimistic	  scenario	  in	  which	  electricity	  consumption	  remains	  stable	  and	  renewable	  electricity	  generation	  increases	  only	  as	  assumed	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  sce-­‐nario	  for	  the	  ministry	  of	  economy	  (BMWi	  2011;	  Fürsch	  et	  al.	  2012),	  the	  use	  of	  coal	  and	  lignite	  are	   reduced	  only	   slowly.	  The	  CO2	   reduction	   from	  Germany’s	  electricity	  produc-­‐tion	  would	  only	  decrease	  by	  around	  20%	  to	  25%	  by	  2020	  (see	  also	  Tables	  S3	  and	  S4).	  	  This	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  nuclear	  electricity	  generation	  and	  CO2	  emissions	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  is	  not	  a	  straightforward	  one.	  As	  a	  long-­‐term	  perspective,	  the	  scenarios	  show	  that	  the	  electricity	  sector	  may	  significantly	  contribute	  to	  GHG	  reductions	  despite	  the	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out.	  But	  this	  would	  need	  strong	  policy	  to	  promote	  in	  particu-­‐lar	  electricity	  savings,	  renewable	  generation	  and	  combined	  heat	  and	  power	  generation	  and	  a	  strengthening	  of	  the	  emission	  trading	  system	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  CO2-­‐prices.	  
5	  Electricity	  price	  effects	  of	  a	  complete	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  Increases	  in	  electricity	  prices	  and	  the	  subsequent	  problems	  for	  electricity	  intensive	  in-­‐dustries	  and	  low-­‐income	  households	  were	  a	  major	  concern	  during	  the	  phase-­‐out	  discus-­‐sions	  in	  the	  spring	  and	  early	  summer	  of	  2011.	  However,	  one	  year	  after	  the	  shutdown	  of	  around	  40%	  of	  Germany’s	  nuclear	  capacity,	  electricity	  prices	  on	   the	  wholesale	  market	  were	  actually	  lower	  than	  before	  the	  plants	  were	  closed15.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  surprising	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  priority	  access	  leads	  to	  high	  security	  for	  renewable	  energy	  investors,	  independent	  of	  short-­‐term	  changes	  in	  the	  electricity	  market.	  14	  Combined	  heat	  and	  power	  plants	  make	  use	  of	  the	  waste	  heat	  that	  occurs	  when	  electricity	  is	  generated	  using	  fossil	  fuels	  and	  biomass.	  Supplying	  this	  heat	  to	  consumers	  avoids	  the	  need	  for	  these	  consumers	  to	  generate	  heat	  themselves	  and,	  therefore,	  saves	  (fossil)	  energy.	  15	  For	  example	  the	  price	  on	  the	  German	  wholesale	  market	  (see	  EEX	  2012)	  for	  one	  MWh	  of	  electricity	  to	  be	  generated	   and	  delivered	   in	   2013	  was	   on	   average	  1%	  higher	   in	   February	  2012	   than	   it	  was	   in	   February	  2011,	  before	  the	  eight	  NPPs	  were	  shut	  down.	  In	  May	  2012	  the	  average	  price	  was	  actually	  8%	  lower	  than	  in	  February	  2011.	  There	  was,	  however,	  a	  brief	  period	  of	  about	   three	  months	   immediately	   following	   the	  decision	   to	  shut	  down	  the	  eight	  NPPs	  when	  electricity	  prices	  were	  higher.	  Prices	  started	  to	   fall	  again	   in	  June	  2011.	  
effect	   is	   probably	   that	   trends	   other	   than	   nuclear	   capacity	   exert	   greater	   influence	   on	  short-­‐term	  electricity	  prices	   (see	  Nestle	  2012,	  155	   ff).	   Future	  electricity	  demand	   fore-­‐casts	  may	  have	  decreased	  between	  early	  2011	  and	  early	  2012	  as	  all	  the	  main	  economic	  forecasts	  were	   lowered	  during	   that	  period.	   It	   is	   likely	   that	   this	  change,	  combined	  with	  falling	  CO2	  emission	  prices,	  had	  a	  dampening	  effect	  on	  electricity	  prices.	  	  This	  does	  mean	  that	  without	  the	  shutdown	  and	  the	  phase-­‐out	  decision,	  electricity	  prices	  might	  have	  been	  even	  lower	  than	  they	  are	  currently.	  Such	  an	  effect	  can	  only	  be	  estimat-­‐ed	  with	  electricity	  market	  models	  as	  has	  been	  done	  in	  a	  number	  of	  recent	  studies.	  Some	  of	  these	  studies	  were	  conducted	  before	  the	  2010	  decision	  to	  prolong	  nuclear	  lifetimes;	  consequently	  they	  estimate	  price	  reductions	  that	  may	  have	  been	  caused	  by	  a	  prolonga-­‐tion	  of	  nuclear	  lifetimes.	  Other	  studies	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2011	  when	  the	  prolongation	  had	  been	  enacted	  and	  its	  reversal	  was	  being	  discussed	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Fukushima.	  These	  studies	  analysed	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  faster	  phase-­‐out	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  prolonged	  lifetimes	  decided	  on	  in	  2010.	  	  To	  support	  the	  political	  decision	  of	  a	  lifetime	  expansion,	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  2010	  the	  gov-­‐ernment	  contracted	  a	  scenario	  study	  (BMWi	  2010;	  Nagl	  et	  al.	  2011).	  By	  using	  an	  elec-­‐tricity	   market	   model	   the	   study	   predicted	   lower	   electricity	   prices	   for	   scenarios	   with	  longer	  lifetime	  extensions	  until	  2030.	  In	  a	  second	  set	  of	  scenarios	  that	  assumed	  higher	  retrofit	  investment	  levels	  for	  the	  existing	  NPPs	  they	  showed,	  however,	  the	  opposite	  re-­‐sult	   (Nagl	   et	   al.	   2011,	   191).	  Nestle	   (2012,	   153)	   reports	   a	   couple	   of	   older	   studies	  with	  similar	  methodology	  and	  partly	  by	  the	  same	  authors	  that	  predicted	  electricity	  price	  re-­‐ductions	  of	  1	  to	  2	  Euro-­‐cent/kWh	  as	  a	  result	  of	  nuclear	  lifetime	  extensions.	  	  During	   the	  spring	  and	  summer	  of	  2011	   further	  modelling	  studies	  were	  prepared	  (r2b,	  2011,	   enervis,	   2011;	   Kemfert/Traber,	   2011;	   Knopf	   et	   al.,	   2011,	   BMWI	   2011)	   that	   at-­‐tempted	  to	  calculate	  the	  effects	  on	  electricity	  prices	  of	  a	  faster	  nuclear	  power	  phase-­‐out.	  According	  to	  these	  studies	  the	  electricity	  price	  for	  end	  users	  in	  a	  fast	  phase-­‐out	  scenario	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  (temporarily)	  0.5	  to	  1.3	  Euro-­‐cent/kWh	  above	  the	  price	  level	  of	  a	  scenario	  with	  a	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  well	  after	  the	  year	  203016.	  In	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  Samadi	  et	   al.	   (2011)	   showed	   that	   this	   could	   be	   an	   overestimation	   due	   to	   two	   main	   reasons.	  Firstly,	  the	  studies	  assumed	  that	  the	  phase-­‐out	  would	  happen	  three	  to	  five	  years	  earlier	  than	  is	  planned.	  Secondly,	   the	  studies	  assumed	  constant	  electricity	  demand	  despite	   in-­‐creasing	   prices	   and	   a	   government	   target	   to	   reduce	   demand	   –	   but	   both	   these	   factors	  would	  work	  against	  an	  increase	  in	  prices	  resulting	  from	  a	  faster	  phase-­‐out	  (Knopf	  et	  al.	  2011).	  	  Based	  on	   this	   discussion	   Samadi	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   conclude	   that	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   electricity	  prices	  for	  end	  users	  would	  rise	  by	  no	  more	  than	  0.7	  Euro-­‐cent/kWh	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  faster	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out	  and	  that	  any	  such	  increase	  would	  be	  temporary.	  It	  is,	  however,	  debatable	  whether	  this	  relatively	  moderate	  price	  increase	  would	  actually	  occur.	  Nestle	  (2012,	  153ff)	  presents	  a	  number	  of	  arguments	  supporting	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  studies’	  re-­‐sults	  could	  still	  be	  exaggerating	  the	  de	  facto	  effects	  of	  longer	  nuclear	  lifetimes.	  He	  argues	  that	  all	  studies	  use	  market	  models	  that	  assume	  a	  perfect	  market,	  which	  definitely	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  Germany.	  Instead,	  in	  real	  life	  longer	  nuclear	  lifetimes	  would	  strengthen	  ex-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Those	   studies	   that	   take	   a	   longer-­‐term	   view	   (especially	   enervis,	   2011)	   indicate	   that	   only	   a	   few	   years	  after	  completion	  of	  an	  early	  phase-­‐out	  the	  price	  difference	  between	  such	  a	  scenario	  and	  a	  late	  phase-­‐out	  scenario	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  mostly	  or	  entirely	  gone.	  Another	  study	  by	  Kunz	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  simulates	  a	  typical	  November	  day	   for	   the	   entire	  European	  electricity	   system.	  They	   find	   that	   the	  price	   effects	   of	   the	  phase-­‐out	  of	   the	  seven	  oldest	  NPPs	  would	  occur	  mainly	  during	  evening	  peaks	  and	  would	  be	  on	  average	  only	  ‘a	  few	  Euros	  per	  MWh’	  (Kunz	  et	  al.	  2011,	  7).	  
isting	  oligopolistic	  structures17	  and,	  therefore,	  might	  lead	  to	  increased	  prices	  instead	  of	  decreased	   prices,	   Nestle	   argues.	   He	   further	   presents	   several	   empirical	   findings	   from	  Germany	   and	   Europe	   that	   do	   not	   show	   any	   indication	   that	   high	   nuclear	   shares	  mean	  lower	  electricity	  prices.	  Finally,	  Nestle	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  security	  of	  investment	  is	  decisive	  in	  providing	  low	  electricity	  prices.	  Following	  the	  (now	  reversed)	  decision	   to	  prolong	   the	   lifetimes	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plants,	  however,	   security	  of	   invest-­‐ment	  was	  significantly	  reduced	  in	  Germany	  due	  to	  several	  lawsuits	  contesting	  the	  politi-­‐cal	  decision	  and	  the	  announcement	  by	  the	  political	  opposition	  to	  revoke	  the	  lifetime	  ex-­‐tensions	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  were	  back	  in	  power	  (Nestle	  2012,	  157).	  The	  phase-­‐out	  that	  has	  now	  been	  decided	  upon	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  political	  consensus	  between	  all	  major	  parties	  in	  Germany	  and	  this	  has,	  therefore,	  provided	  greater	  certainty	  for	  investors18.	  
6	  Conclusion	  Despite	  initial	  concerns	  about	  Germany’s	  decision	  to	  phase	  out	  nuclear	  power	  by	  2022,	  recent	  statistics	  as	  well	  as	  scenarios	  and	  political	  targets	  show	  that	  Germany	  has	  a	  real-­‐istic	  chance	  of	  fully	  replacing	  nuclear	  power	  with	  renewable	  electricity	  generation	  on	  an	  annual	  basis,	  provided	  that	  several	  related	  challenges,	  e.g.	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  grids	  and	  provision	  of	  balancing	  power,	  can	  be	  solved	  successfully.	  By	  as	  early	  as	  2011,	  the	  share	  of	  renewable	  energy	  sources	   in	  gross	  electricity	  generation	  was	  at	  20%,	  which	   for	   the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  early	  years	  of	  nuclear	  power	  in	  Germany	  in	  the	  mid	  1970s	  was	  high-­‐er	  than	  the	  respective	  share	  of	  nuclear	  power	  (about	  18%	  in	  2011).	  Despite	  phasing	  out	  nuclear	   power,	   Germany	   does	   not	   have	   to	   become	   a	   net	   electricity	   importer,	   nor	  will	  Germany	   be	   unable	   to	   gradually	   reduce	   fossil	   fuel	   generated	   electricity.	  Whether	   this	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  adequately	  contribute	  to	  national	  greenhouse	  gas	  mitigation	  targets	  significantly	  depends	  on	  an	  active	  policy	   to	  promote	  electricity	   savings,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  further	  expansion	  of	  renewables	  and	  combined	  heat	  and	  power	  generation.	  The	  fact	  that	  Germany	  was	  able	  to	  achieve	  its	  nuclear	  policy	  turnaround	  so	  smoothly	  in	  2011	   by	   (already	   in	   the	   first	   year)	   replacing	   as	  much	   as	   60%	   of	   the	   reduced	   nuclear	  power	  generation	  with	  additional	  renewable	  electricity	  is	  not	  surprising.	  An	  important	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  phase-­‐out	  decision	  made	  in	  2011	  is	  technically	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  ini-­‐tial	  German	  phase-­‐out	  plans	  that	  were	  already	  in	  place	  between	  2002	  and	  the	  autumn	  of	  2010.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  German	  energy	  industry	  was	  prepared	  and	  the	  feed-­‐in-­‐tariff	  system	  ratified	  in	  the	  year	  2000	  through	  the	  Renewable	  Energy	  Sources	  Act	  was	  particu-­‐larly	   effective	   in	   significantly	   increasing	   electricity	   supply	   from	   renewable	   sources.	  Germany's	   ‘trust	   in	  renewable	  energy	   innovation’,	  as	  Wittneben	  (2011)	  put	   it,	  appears	  to	  be	  justified.	  The	  successful	  expansion	  of	  renewable	  energy	  use	  in	  the	  electricity	  sector	  in	   Germany	   in	   recent	   years	   was	   also	   pinpointed	   as	   the	   main	   reason	   that	   the	   Ethics	  Commission	   for	   a	   Safe	   Energy	   Supply,	   as	   established	   by	   Chancellor	   Merkel	   in	   March	  2011,	   supported	  a	  quick	  nuclear	  phase-­‐out.	  This	   commission	   concluded	   that	  Germany	  does,	  in	  fact,	  have	  ‘less	  risky	  alternatives’	  than	  nuclear	  and	  should,	  therefore,	  use	  these	  alternatives	  (Ethics	  Commission	  for	  a	  Safe	  Energy	  Supply,	  2011).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The	   assumption	   of	   oligopolistic	   or	   even	   duopolistic	   structures	   in	   the	   German	   electricity	   market	   is	  shared	  by	   several	  other	  authors,	   e.g.	   Liebau/Ströbele	   (2011,	  23),	  Bohne	   (2011,	  260)	  and	  Langniß	  et	   al.	  (2009,	  1291).	  18	  The	  current	  phase-­‐out	  (compared	  to	  the	  situation	  before	  2010	  when	  the	  old	  phase-­‐out	  decision	  was	  in	  place)	   has	   an	   even	  broader	   societal	   consensus	  behind	   it.	   This	   of	   course	   increases	   the	  opportunities	   for	  stable	   and	   clear	   investment	   frameworks	   in	   years	   to	   come.	  However,	   switching	   to	   renewable	   electricity	  imposes	  new	  challenges	  and	  also	  uncertainties,	  which	  will	  also	  have	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  order	  to	  deliver	  a	  stable	  framework.	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  Material	  	  	  
Table	  S1:	  Compensation	  of	  reduced	  nuclear	  electricity	  generation	  between	  2011	  and	  2013,	  based	  on	  preliminary	  statistics	  and	  projections	  (in	  TWh)	  	  	  	   	   2011	  a	   2012	  b	   2013	  b	  1	   Reduced	  nuclear	  electricity	  generation	  (vs.	  2010)	   32.5	   40.9	   40.9	  2	   Compensation	  (vs.	  2010)	  by	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Additional	  renewable	  electricity	  generation	   19.2	   31.9	   43.0	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Reduced	  net	  exports	   11.7	   17.7	   17.7	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Reduced	  domestic	  electricity	  demand	   1.9	   8.7	   12.3	  3	   Change	  in	  domestic	  fossil	  power	  generation	  vs.	  2010	  (equals	  1-­‐2)	   -­‐0.3	   -­‐17.4	   -­‐32.1	  
a	  Preliminary	  Statistics:	  AG	  Energiebilanzen	  (2012);	  b	  Based	  on	  projections	  for	  TSOs:	  IE	  (2011),	  Prognos	  
(2011),	  on	  IAEA	  (2012)	  and	  on	  own	  assumptions.	  	  Explanation	  of	  the	  data	  in	  Table	  S1:	  	  -­‐ Data	  for	  2010	  and	  2011	  is	  according	  to	  AG	  Energiebilanzen	  (2012).	  -­‐ Data	  for	  2012	  and	  2013	  is	  based	  on	  the	  following	  sources	  and	  assumptions:	  
o Nuclear	  electricity	  generation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  each	  remaining	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  will	  have	  the	  same	  capacity	  factor	  (on	  average	  about	  91%)	  as	  it	  had	  over	  the	  years	  2001	  to	  2010	  (IAEA	  2012).	  
o Additional	  renewable	  electricity	  generation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  changes	  in	  domestic	  electricity	  demand	  are	  based	  on	  projections	  prepared	  for	  the	  German	  transmis-­‐sion	  system	  operators	  (IE	  2011	  and	  Prognos	  2011).	  
o For	  net	  exports	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  Germany	  will	  export	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  elec-­‐tricity	  as	  it	  will	  import	  (net	  exports	  or	  net	  imports	  =	  0).	  	  	  	  
Table	  S2:	  Electricity	  generation	  from	  domestic	  renewable	  energy	  by	  source	  in	  2010	  and	  2011	  as	  well	  as	  in	  2016,	  2020	  and	  2025	  according	  to	  different	  projections,	  scenarios	  and	  political	  targets/expectations	  	  
	   2010	   2011	   2016	  
	  













Hydro	   21	   20	   22	   19	   19	   23	  
Wind	  onshore	   38	   46	   67	   65	   65	   63	  
Wind	  offshore	   0	   1	   12	   14	   11	   21	  
Biomass	   32	   37	   45	   43	   44	   42	  
Solar	  PV	   12	   19	   33	   28	   29	   39	  
Geothermal	   0	   0	   1	   1	   1	   0	  
TOTAL	   103	   122	   176	   168	   168	   189	  	  
	   2020	   2025	  





















Hydro	   22	   20	   20	   23	   23	   24	  
Wind	  onshore	   82	   69	   73	   145	   91	   76	  
Wind	  offshore	   33	   32	   32	   55	   61	   44	  
Biomass	   50	   44	   49	   49	   53	   49	  
Solar	  PV	   45	   32	   41	   40	   50	   36	  
Geothermal	   2	   1	   2	   3	   4	   2	  




Table	  S3:	  Gross	  electricity	  consumption,	  gross	  electricity	  generation	  according	  to	  ener-­‐gy	  source	  and	  net	  imports	  (in	  TWh)	  in	  2000	  and	  2010	  as	  well	  as	  in	  2020	  and	  2025	  in	  two	  different	  scenarios	  
	   	   Actual	   Low	  Fossil	  Sce-­‐nario	  
High	  Fossil	  Sce-­‐
nario	  
	   	   2000	   2010	   2020	   2025	   2020	   2025	  
1	   Gross	  electricity	  consumption	   580	   610	   553	   538	   609	   609	  
2	   Gross	  electricity	  generation	   	   	   	   	   	   	  2a	   	  	  	  	  	  Nuclear	   148	   141	   67	   0	   67	   0	  2b	   	  	  	  	  	  Renewable	   38	   103	   234	   283	   199	   231	  2c	   	  	  	  	  	  Fossil	  (equals	  1–2a–2b–3)	   391	   384	   252	   255	   343	   378	  
3	   Net	  imports	   3	   -­‐18	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Sources:	  AG	  Energiebilanzen	  (2012),	  BMU	  (2012),	  BMWi	  (2011),	  German	  Government	  (2010b).	  
	  
	  Explanation	  of	  the	  data	  in	  Table	  S3:	  	  Data	  for	  2000	  and	  2010	  is	  based	  on	  AG	  Energiebilanzen	  (2012).	  Data	  for	  2020	  and	  2025	  for	  the	  two	  scenarios	  is	  based	  on	  the	  following	  sources	  and	  assump-­‐tions:	  -­‐ Gross	  electricity	  consumption	  in	  the	  ‘Low	  Fossil’	  scenario	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  German	  government’s	  target	  of	  reducing	  electricity	  demand	  by	  10%	  by	  2020	  and	  of	  25%	  by	  2050	  (vs.	  2008,	  see	  German	  Government	  2010b)	  will	  be	  met.	  For	  the	  ‘High	  Fossil’	  scenario	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  electricity	  demand	  will	  remain	  stable	  at	  the	  2011	  level	  (2011	  electricity	  demand	  is	  from	  AG	  Energiebilanzen	  2012).	  -­‐ Nuclear	  electricity	  generation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  each	  remaining	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  will	  remain	  in	  operation	  until	  the	  final	  day	  permitted	  under	  the	  current	  nu-­‐clear	  phase-­‐out	  law.	  During	  this	  time	  each	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  will	  have	  the	  same	  capac-­‐ity	  factor	  (on	  average	  about	  91%)	  as	  it	  had	  over	  the	  past	  ten	  years	  (IAEA	  2012).	  -­‐ Renewable	  electricity	  generation	  in	  the	  ‘Low	  Fossil’	  scenario	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  scenario	  prepared	  for	  the	  German	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Environment	  (BMU	  2012),	  while	  in	  the	  ‘High	  Fossil’	  scenario	  it	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  scenario	  prepared	  for	  the	  German	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Economy	  (BMWi	  2011).	  See	  also	  the	  figures	  for	  renewable	  electricity	  generation	  in	  Table	  S2.	  -­‐ For	  net	  exports	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  Germany	  will	  export	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  electricity	  as	  it	  will	  import	  (net	  imports	  =	  0).	  	  	  
Table	  S4:	  Fossil	  electricity	  generation,	  specific	  fossil	  CO2	  emissions	  and	  electricity	  	  sector	  CO2	  emissions	  in	  1990	  and	  2010	  as	  well	  as	  in	  2020	  and	  2025	  in	  two	  different	  	  scenarios	  	  
	   	   	   Low	  Fossil	  	  Scenario	  
High	  Fossil	  
Scenario	  
	   1990	   2010	   2020	   2025	   2020	   2025	  
Fossil	  electricity	  generation	  (in	  TWh)	   378	   385	   252	   255	   341	   376	  
Specific	  CO2	  emissions	  (in	  g/kWhfossil)	   945	   785	   709	   657	   816	   717	  
Electricity	  sector	  CO2	  emissions	  (in	  Mt)	   357	   302	   179	   168	   278	   269	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Change	  vs.	  1990	   -­‐	   -­‐15%	   -­‐50%	   -­‐53%	   -­‐22%	   -­‐25%	  
Sources:	  Lechtenböhmer/Samadi	  (2012),	  UBA	  (2012),	  AG	  Energiebilanzen	  (2012),	  BMU	  (2012),	  
BMWi	  (2011).	  See	  Table	  S3	  for	  additional	  sources	  used	  to	  derive	  fossil	  electricity	  generation	  for	  the	  
two	  scenarios.	  	  Explanation	  of	  the	  data	  in	  table	  S4:	  	  Data	  for	  1990	  and	  2010	  is	  based	  on	  the	  following	  sources:	  -­‐ UBA	  (2012)	  provides	  data	  for	  CO2	  emissions	  from	  the	  electricity	  sector.	  -­‐ AG	  Energiebilanzen	  (2012)	  provides	  data	  for	  fossil	  electricity	  generation.	  The	  two	  scenarios	  have	  been	  further	  described	  in	  Lechtenböhmer/Samadi	  (2012):	  Data	  for	  2025	  for	  the	  two	  scenarios	  is	  based	  on	  the	  following	  sources	  and	  assumptions:	  -­‐ Fossil	  electricity	  generation	  is	  derived	  as	  explained	  by	  Table	  S3.	  -­‐ Specific	  CO2	  emissions	  from	  fossil	  electricity	  generation	  are	  based	  on	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  shown	  in	  the	  scenario	  study	  for	  the	  German	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Environment	  (BMU,	  2012,	  for	  the	  Low	  Fossil	  scenario)	  and	  on	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  shown	  in	  the	  scenario	  study	  for	  
the	  German	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Economy	  (BMWi,	  2011,	  for	  the	  High	  Fossil	  scenario).	  In	  the	  scenario	  of	  BMU	  (2012)	  electricity	  generation	  from	  natural	  gas	  power	  plants	  gains	  in	  relevance	  relative	  to	  electricity	  generation	  from	  coal	  and	  lignite,	  while	  this	  is	  not	  imme-­‐diately	  the	  case	  in	  the	  BMWi	  (2011)	  scenario.	  This	  is	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  specific	  CO2	  emissions	  of	  fossil	  electricity	  generation.	  Another	  factor	  that	  can	  play	  a	  role	  is	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  efficiency	  of	  fossil	  power	  plants	  improves.	  Furthermore,	  the	  use	  of	  Carbon	  Capture	  and	  Storage	  (CCS)	  technology	  can	  reduce	  specific	  CO2	  emis-­‐sions.	  CCS	  technology	  is	  used	  in	  the	  BMWi	  (2011)	  scenario,	  but	  only	  to	  a	  small	  extent	  by	  2025.	  CCS	  technology	  is	  not	  used	  in	  the	  BMU	  (2012)	  scenario.	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